We construct a model of the credit market where lenders use two incentive devices, monitoring and termination, to enforce truth-telling and effort-making. The economy's aggregate activity and its equilibrium lending mechanism are determined jointly and endogenously. We analyze how changes in the model's exogenous variables, including the returns of the economy's investment projects and the supply of loans, affect the economy's aggregate output and the types of the credit through which investment is funded.
Introduction
We study a problem of optimal contracting where the lender (investor) chooses between two costly incentive devices, monitoring (costly-state-verification) and termination (liquidation), to induce truth-telling and efforts from the borrower (entrepreneur). We then embed the optimal contract in a competitive credit market environment to study how the form of the equilibrium lending contract and the equilibrium aggregate output respond to changes in the model's exogenous variables, including the size of the projects' returns, the number of available projects, and the supply of loanable funds.
In the model, after an investment project is funded initially, the entrepreneur (borrower) observes a random signal θ ∈ [0, 1] that indicates the project's success rate. This signal is private to the entrepreneur unless the investor (lender) pays a fixed cost to verify the entrepreneur's report. The project can then be terminated or fully implemented. In the latter case, the entrepreneur must make an unobservable effort to carry out the rest of the investment process. The final output of the project then depends stochastically on θ and the entrepreneur's unobservable effort. Specifically, if the entrepreneur makes the required effort t, then the project returns H(> 0) with probability θ, and zero with probability 1−θ.
We show that a decrease in the size of the projects' return H can cause more initially funded projects to be terminated. Consequently, the economy's aggregate output will fall, accompanied by a switch of the economy's equilibrium lending mechanism from monitored loans to non-monitored loans. The logic of this is the following. As H falls, termination becomes less costly, as the projects are worth less if they are continued. On the other hand, as H falls, the costs to the investor of using monitoring as an incentive device are not directly affected. Therefore, as H falls, termination becomes a more efficient incentive device relative to monitoring. In particular, we show that a sufficiently low H will drive the demand for monitoring to zero: monitoring will not be used at all in the equilibrium lending contract. In other words, a decrease in the returns of the projects weakens the case for monitoring and leads to a shift of the equilibrium lending contract from monitored loans to non-monitored loans. Meanwhile, as more projects are terminated, total outstanding loans fall, the success rates of the fully implemented projects (those not terminated) are higher, and the economy's aggregate output falls.
In the model, a fall in the supply of credit can create two effects: a credit effect and an interest rate effect. The credit effect occurs as a fall in the supply of loans causes fewer projects to be funded initially. The interest rate effect occurs as a fall in the supply of loans causes the bargaining power to shift away from the entrepreneurs and to the investors. This causes the investor's expected returns on loans (interest rate) to go up and the expected utilities of the entrepreneurs to go down. A lower expected utility for the entrepreneur makes the incentive problem more severe. This in turn creates more demand for the use of the incentive devices, and the equilibrium contract thus shifts toward more monitoring and termination. Aggregate output is lower. The two effects imply that a decrease in the supply of loans causes fewer projects to be funded initially, and among the projects that are funded initially, a larger fraction will face termination subsequently.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in the model, an increase in the number of investment opportunities (entrepreneurs) may or may not cause the economy's aggregate output to increase. This has to do with the interest rate effect we have just described. On the one hand, an increase in the supply of projects implies that more projects are funded, in the case where there is an excess supply of funds. On the other hand, as in the case of a decrease in the supply of loans, an increase in the supply of projects shifts the bargaining power away from the entrepreneurs to the investors, causing a lower equilibrium expected utility for the entrepreneurs, making the incentive problem more severe, interest rates higher, and hence a larger proportion of the funded projects terminated. Thus if the interest rate effect dominates, the economy can actually see its total output decrease following an increase in the supply of investment projects.
The costly state verification (CSV) component of the model has its roots in the work of Townsend [1979] , Gale and Hellwig [1985] , Williamson [1986 Williamson [ , 1987a , and Boyd and Smith [1997] . The difference is, in the existing CSV models, verification is typically on the project's realized returns, here it is on the project's ex ante success rate. This feature of the model leaves us room to add an additional continuation/termination choice to the lending process. Termination is then interpreted as liquidation or bankruptcy, a process that is separate from verification or monitoring. In the CSV literature, a state of verification is sometimes interpreted as a state of bankruptcy where the lender seizes all of the borrower's assets (Williamson [1987b] ). Our model explicitly separates the roles of monitoring and termination in the CSV model.
While adding termination/continuation problem to the CSV setup makes the problem more interesting, it also makes the problem much more difficult to solve. We show that the optimal contract in our model can be fully characterized, in a partial equilibrium setting, and in an equilibrium environment as well.
In our model, whenever there is a shortage of funds, in equilibrium there is always credit rationing of the type discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and Williamson [1986 Williamson [ , 1987a , where among the model's ex ante identical borrowers, those who receive loans are strictly better off than those who do not. Credit rationing in our model is motivated by costly state verification (as in Williamson [1987a] ) and costly termination. If the entrepreneur is promised a sufficiently low expected utility, then the investor must incur either too much monitoring or too much termination, in order to implement incentives. The notion that credit rationing is a mechanism to avoid excessive termination has not been documented in the literature.
Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we study the problem of optimal contracting between an investor and an entrepreneur. Section 4 embeds the optimal contract in a competitive credit market framework. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
There are three periods, τ = 0, 1, 2. There are two types of agents, investors and entrepreneurs. The measure of the investors is λ, and the measure of the entrepreneurs is δ. Investors and entrepreneurs all maximize the expected value of u(c, e) = c − e, where c is consumption and e is effort. We assume that there is no discounting across periods. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of events, where I denotes the investor and E denotes the entrepreneur. In period 0, each investor has one indivisible unit of the investment good, which can either go to an entrepreneur in exchange for a financial contract to be described later, or earn a constant return equal to one unit of consumption in period 2 through storage. Each investor also has access to ξ(> 0) units of the consumption good in period 2. We will assume that ξ is large enough in a sense that will become clear after we lay out the financial contract. contract, invest
At τ = 0, each entrepreneur owns a risky investment project. Entrepreneurs have no initial wealth, and hence must rely on external financing for their projects. Each project requires one unit of the investment good in period 0 to start, which an entrepreneur can acquire from an investor. Consider an arbitrary entrepreneur-investor pair. If the project is funded, then at the beginning of τ = 1, the entrepreneur observes a signal θ. Here θ ∈ [0, 1] ≡ Θ is a random variable that represents the state of the project. The precise meaning of θ will be given shortly. We assume that θ is a continuous random variable on Θ with a distribution function G(θ) and a density g(θ). Assume for all θ ∈ Θ, g(θ) > 0. The signal θ is directly observable only to the entrepreneur. The investor can observe the realization of θ through a costly monitoring process, which requires γ ≥ 0 units of the investor's effort.
The investor may or may not monitor, but a decision must be made in period 1 whether to continue the project. If the investor monitors the entrepreneur's report of θ, then the decision can be based on the true value of θ. Otherwise, the termination/continuation decision may take into account only the entrepreneur's report of the realization of θ. The termination value of the project is ≥ 0.
Suppose the investment is continued. Then at τ = 2, the entrepreneur must make an effort t > 0 to finally complete the project. The entrepreneur's effort is not observable to other parties. In other words, there is moral hazard. If the entrepreneur makes the required effort, then with probability θ the project succeeds and the return is H > 0, and with probability 1 − θ it fails and the return is 0. If the entrepreneur does not make the required effort, then the project yields a return of 0 with probability one. In the following, we call H the potential return of the project, and θ the project's success rate.
We make some further assumptions. First, all payments to the entrepreneur must be non-negative (limited liability). Second, renegotiations are not allowed. In other words, we assume that once the contract is signed, both parties can fully commit, at all stages of the investment process, to the terms of the initial contract. Third, the potential return of the project H is higher than the opportunity cost had the project been terminated; that is,
Finally, we make a technical assumption to guarantee the uniqueness of solution to the optimal contracting problem in the sections to follow.
Assumption (2)
There is a wide range of distribution functions with support [0, 1] that satisfy this condition, including the uniform distribution function. We now describe the credit market. At τ = 0, there is a credit market in which investors offer lending contracts to entrepreneurs who exchange investment opportunities for credit and compensation. Given that all projects are identical ex ante, in the credit market equilibrium that we will define later, each contract promises expected utility equal to u * 0 to the entrepreneur who sells his project in the credit market. This equilibrium expected utility to the entrepreneur will be determined endogenously. But in order to characterize an equilibrium, we must first determine the form of the optimal contract between an investor and an entrepreneur that maximizes the investor's expected utility, subject to the constraint that the entrepreneur gets a minimum of u 0 in expected utility.
Optimal Contracting
In this section, we determine the optimal contract between a representative investor and a representative entrepreneur, taking as given that, in equilibrium, contracts must promise the entrepreneur expected utility of no less than u 0 ≥ 0.
The First-Best Contract
Consider the case where both the realization of θ and the entrepreneur effort t are publicly observable. In this case, a contract must specify a fixed compensation x to the entrepreneur, and a termination/continuation policy Φ. Here Φ is a subset of Θ: if θ ∈ Φ, then the project is continued; otherwise, it is terminated. Given the environment, the optimal contract must implement t as the entrepreneur's effort.
Let Φ denote the complement of the set Φ. The problem of optimal contracting can then be formulated as follows.
The objective function (1) represents the investor's expected payoff.
1 Condition (2) is the entrepreneur's participation constraint. Clearly, constraint (2) must be binding, since otherwise the value of x can be reduced to improve the investor's expected payoff without 1 For convenience, we omit the constant unit cost of date-0 investment in all of the objective functions.
violating the participation constraint. By substituting constraint (2) into the objective function, the optimal contracting problem can be rewritten as follows,
Now if θH − (t + ) ≥ 0, then the above inequality holds because of the first half of assumption (2). If θH − (t + ) < 0, then the inequality holds by the second inequality of assumption (2). 4 In the case where t is observable to the investor, consider the following contract: x = u 0 , Φ = [θ fb , 1], there is no monitoring, and the entrepreneur's compensation in period 2 is equal to t whenever he reports θ ∈ [θ fb , 1] and makes effort t. This contract is incentive compatible (the entrepreneur is indifferent between reporting truthfully and lying) and always implements the first-best outcome.
We now consider our original problem, where the realization of the project's success rate θ is directly observable only to the entrepreneur. The investor can observe the value of θ at a cost γ > 0. Moreover, there is moral hazard: the entrepreneur's effort is not observable.
The Definition of Contract
With costly monitoring and moral hazard, a loan contract has three components: (i) a monitoring policy M for verifying a report θ, (ii) a termination/continuation policy Φ which determines whether a project with a given θ should be terminated, and (iii) a scheme of state contingent compensations to the entrepreneur. Formally, a contract takes the following form:
We abstract from stochastic monitoring. Thus, the monitoring policy M is a subset of Θ in which verification of the reported state will occur: monitoring takes place if and only if the entrepreneur's reportθ ∈ M .
The termination/continuation policy Φ is also a subset of Θ. Unlike in the case of complete information, here the interpretation of Φ must take into account the fact that there is information asymmetry between the investor and the entrepreneur concerning the realization of θ. Letθ denote the investor's knowledge of the realization of θ on which the termination/continuation decision must be conditioned, andθ the entrepreneur's report,
Then the project is continued ifθ ∈ Φ, and it is terminated ifθ ∈ Φ. When the project is terminated, the investor seizes the scrap value of the project , and the entrepreneur receives a payment y(θ). When the project is continued, the entrepreneur receives R 0 (θ) ≥ 0 if the project eventually fails; and otherwise R 0 (θ) + R(θ) ≥ 0 if the project succeeds and the return H is realized. Finally, the entrepreneur also receives a fixed payment equal to x ≥ 0, independent of anything that occurs after the investment has taken place.
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We assume that if the entrepreneur is indifferent between reporting truthfully and lying, he reports truthfully. This implies that the entrepreneur will not submit a false report of θ for monitoring. In other words, Ifθ(θ) ∈ M, thenθ(θ) = θ, whereθ(θ) denotes the entrepreneur's report of θ.
At this point, it is useful to define the following subsets of Θ: Consider set D, the non-monitoring/termination region. Suppose that θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ D and y(θ 1 ) > y(θ 2 ). Then, whenever θ 2 is realized, the entrepreneur could lie and report θ 1 to get the higher payoff y(θ 1 ), given that both θ 1 and θ 2 are not monitored. This implies that incentive compatible y(θ) must be constant on
With the partition of Θ, an incentive compatible contract must satisfy the following three sets of incentive constraints. First, there should be no incentives for the entrepreneur to report untruthfully aθ ∈ C in order to continue the investment process without being monitored (conditions (6) and (8)). Second, there should be no incentives for the entrepreneur to report untruthfully aθ ∈ D, either to abandon a good project in order to avoid making effort and receive compensation Y D (condition (7)), or to simply avoid being monitored (condition (9)). Third, there should be no incentives for the entrepreneur to shirk when the project is continued (condition (10)). Formally, Truth-telling constraints:
Effort constraint:
The entrepreneur's participation constraint is as follows:
We call a contract optimal if it maximizes the investor's expected payoff, subject to the incentive constraints, the participation constraint, and the non-negativity constraint (13).
That is, an optimal contract solves the following problem:
where µ denotes the probability measure on Θ: for any set Z ⊆ Θ, µ(Z) = Z dG(θ).
The Optimal Contract
We now characterize the optimal contract. The approach is to simplify the incentive constraints, which allow us to successively focus on simpler and simpler classes of contract that are equivalent to the solution to the original problem. In what follows, we say that two contracts are equivalent if they are subject to the same constraints and deliver the same expected payoffs to both the investor and the entrepreneur. Proposition 1. For any contract σ that solves (P 1), there exists a contractσ that is equivalent to σ, andσ has the following properties: for all θ ∈ A ∪ C, R 0 (θ) = 0, and for all θ ∈ C, R(θ) = R C , where R C ≥ 0 is a constant.
The proof of Propositions 1 is in the appendix. By Proposition 1, we can simplify the contract in its compensation structure. First, conditional on the project being continued, the entrepreneur's compensation is zero if the project fails. This imposes the largest possible punishment for a bad outcome. Second, if the project succeeds and if there was no monitoring, the entrepreneur's compensation is constant, independent of his report of θ. This feature is required by truth-telling.
Given that we can set R 0 (θ) = 0 on ∈ A ∪ C, constraint (10) implies R(θ) ≥ t/θ > 0 for all θ in A and C. This in turn implies the non-negativity of R(θ) for all θ ∈ A and the non-negativity of R C . We can then rewrite the optimal contracting problem as follows:
and the following incentive constraints,
The next proposition says that the optimal termination/continuation policy is monotonic: if a project with success rate θ is continued, then any project with a higher success rate should also be continued.
Proposition 2. For any optimal contract σ that solves problem (P 2), there exists a contractσ that is equivalent to σ, and thatσ has the following property: if θ 1 ∈ Φ and θ 2 ∈ Φ , then θ 1 > θ 2 .
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the appendix. The idea is simple. Suppose a project with a higher success rate θ 1 is continued, but a project with a lower success rate θ 2 (> θ 1 ) is terminated. Then switching the termination/continuation decision on θ 1 and θ 2 , and re-arranging the compensation schemes properly can yield a Pareto improvement, contradicting to the optimality of the contract. Given Proposition 2, we can then focus, without loss of generality, on contracts with monotonic termination/continuation policies; that is, contracts in which the set Φ is an upper interval of Θ. Thus far, the analysis yields an optimal contract with the following properties.
Proposition 3. The optimal contract has the following characteristics:
(ii) There exist constants θ m and θ n , 0 < θ m ≤ θ n ≤ 1 such that
(iii) Moreover, the optimal compensation scheme is:
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the appendix. The idea is as follows. First, it is never optimal to have the project monitored and then abandoned: it would be a waste of resources. Moreover, it is optimal to not monitor reports of θ that are either too high or too low, or put differently, when the "news" from the entrepreneur is sufficiently good, or sufficiently bad. Despite this non-monotonicity over Θ, the optimal monitoring strategy is monotonic in the continuation region of Θ. More precisely, conditional on a project being continued, it is optimal to monitor lower rather than higher reports of θ. To see this, suppose among the projects that are continued, there are some with a higher θ ∈ A that are monitored than those that are not monitored (in C). Then not monitoring projects with report θ (move it into C) reduces the compensation at θ from R(θ ) to R C ; meanwhile, increase the fixed payment x so that the entrepreneur's expected payoff remains constant. This change does not violate incentive compatibility: (a) The effort-making constraint is satisfied at θ since it is satisfied at the lowest state in C; and by assumption, θ is strictly greater than the lowest state in C; (b) when the realization is θ , there are no incentives for the entrepreneur to misreport a θ in D, 6 and (c) there are no incentives for the entrepreneur to misreport a θ = θ in C since the payoff is constant in C. However, this change strictly improves the investor's expected payoff because it reduces monitoring cost in state θ . The entrepreneur's optimal compensation schedule has the following feature. It is zero when the project is abandoned and when the project is continued but fails. It is nonlinear in θ when the project is continued and successful: decreasing in θ in the monitoring region, and constant (but positive) across the non-monitoring region. Such a schedule is optimal because the entrepreneur's compensation (Y D on D, R(θ) on A and R C on C) should be set just high enough so that there are sufficient incentives for truth-telling and effortmaking. Having the levels of Y D , R(θ) and R C too high is potentially costly: it may cause the entrepreneur's overall expected utility to exceed his reservation utility, given that x ≥ 0. Given (i) and (ii), it is easy to check that the compensation scheme specified in the proposition is the lowest that satisfies all the incentive constraints.
Given Proposition 3, the optimal contract is characterized fully by the variables x, θ m , and θ n , with x ≥ 0 and θ m ≤ θ n . So, the optimal contracting problem (P 2) can be rewritten as
where
Here T (θ n ) is the expected utility that the contract delivers to the entrepreneur if all projects with θ ≥ θ n are continued but not monitored. By (28), T (θ n ) < 0. That is, in the absence of monitoring, higher expected utility must be promised to the entrepreneur the larger the continuation region (the lower θ n ).
Obviously, problem (P 3) has a solution; denote it {x * , θ * m , θ * n }. We now solve for this solution. First, if it holds that
then clearly
and
That is, if condition (29) holds, then the optimal contract does not involve monitoring, and the optimal cutoff level for continuation coincides with the first-best continuation level θ fb . In fact, condition (29) is the necessary and sufficient condition for (30)-(31) to be the solution for (P 3) and for the first-best continuation/termination policy to be achievable.
Next, suppose that condition (29) does not hold. Then it must be the case that x * = 0, for otherwise, given T (θ n ) < 0, it is possible to reduce the values of x and θ n simultaneously and to increase the investor's expected payoff without violating the participation constraint (26). With x * = 0, constraint (26) becomes T (θ n ) ≥ u 0 . Letθ n be the level of θ at which the constraint binds,
Since u 0 = T (θ n ) < T (θ fb ), and T is decreasing in θ n , we have θ fb <θ n ≤ 1. The participation constraint T (θ n ) ≥ u 0 is equivalent to θ n ≤θ n . So for the case of u 0 < T (θ fb ), problem (P 3) can be further simplified as follows:
Problem (P 4) is well defined: the objective function O(θ m , θ n ) is strictly concave, and the constraint set defined by (34) is convex, so it has a unique solution. To characterize this solution, we first define a set of important variables. Let {θ m ,θ n } be the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem of (P4), ignoring constraint (34). By the first-order conditions of the unconstraint problem,
In addition, letθ n be the solution to the following equation:
It is easy to show that θ fb <θ m ≤ 1, 0 ≤θ n < 1, and θ fb <θ n < 1. Now we are ready to state to solution for optimal contracting problem (P 3).
Proposition 4. The optimal contract takes one of the following three forms:
, and x * = 0,
, and x * = 0.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix. The contract σ fb n in (i) achieves the first-best outcome with no monitoring. When the first-best is not achievable, that is, when u 0 = T (θ n ) < T (θ fb ), either there is monitoring in states of θ that belong to a nonempty region
, or there is no monitoring at all (contract σ sb n ). Proposition 4 shows that the exact form of the optimal contract depends critically on u 0 , the reservation utility of the entrepreneur. This will be important for the equilibrium analysis of the model that is to come.
Corollary. If the first-best is not attainable, there is over-liquidation at the optimum. This is true because, in the cases where monitoring is optimal, the continuation cutoff θ * m =θ m > θ fb ; and in the cases where monitoring is not optimal, the continuation cutoff θ * n = min{θ n ,θ n } > θ fb , sinceθ n > θ fb andθ n > θ fb .
Proposition 4 also shows that unless the first-best is attainable, the non-state-contingent component of the compensation is zero (x = 0). Moreover, at the optimum, the entrepreneur earns positive compensation only in the states where the project is carried out without being monitored and when the project is ultimately successful.
The Investor's Value Function
Let V (u 0 ) denote the investor's net value as a function of the entrepreneur's reservation utility u 0 . Then,
Obviously, when the first-best is attainable, V (u 0 ) coincides with V fb (u 0 ) as defined in (5).
By Proposition 4, given the parameters of the model, H, γ, , and t, there are two possible cases: (1)θ m <θ n where for some values of the entrepreneur's reservation utility u 0 , the optimal contract involves monitoring, and (2)θ m ≥θ n where there is no monitoring, regardless of the value of u 0 . Define
Notice that Λ is not a function of u 0 .
Consider case (1) (Λ > 0). By Proposition 4, the value function (38) can be divided into four segments, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 2 . When u 0 ≥û 0 , wherê
the optimal contract is the first-best σ fb n . The cutoff level of the entrepreneur's reservation utility that divides σ sb m and σ sb n , call itū 0 , is determined byθ n =θ m , or
Clearly, 0 <ū 0 ≤û 0 .
When the optimal contract is σ sb n , i.e., when u 0 ∈ [ū 0 ,û 0 ), the cutoff level of θ below which the project is terminated, θ * n , is given byθ n . That is, higher project continuation threshhold is reqiured as u 0 decreases. The entrepreneur is paid exactly u 0 , and the function V is strictly decreasing in u 0 . When the optimal contract is σ sb m , i.e. when u 0 ∈ [0,ū 0 ), the cutoff level of θ above which the continued project is not monitored, θ * n , can be eitherθ n or θ n . When θ * n =θ n , the entrepreneur is paid exactly u 0 , and V is strictly decreasing in u 0 . When θ * n =θ n , the entrepreneur is paid T (θ n ), which is independent of u 0 , and as a result V is constant in u 0 . Let u 1 0 be the boundary between the two regions, which is determined byθ n =θ n ; that is, u
In case (2) (Λ ≤ 0), the value function V is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 . Here, monitoring is not optimal for all values of u 0 . Moreover, the investor's value function is flat over the range of u 0 ≤ u 2 0 where
It is easy to verify that u Case (1). Λ > 0.
Case (2). Λ ≤ 0.
Monitoring and Termination: Comparative Statics
We now discuss how the form of optimal contract responds to changes to the parameters of the model. We first discuss the role of entrepreneur's expected utility u 0 , an endogenous variable of the credit market but assumed as given now, in determining the optimal contract. We will then discuss the impact of other exogenous parameters H, γ and .
Throughout the discussion, there are three costly incentive devices that an optimal contract utilize to achieve truth-telling and effort-making.
Device A: The investor can set a higher continuation threshold to terminate projects that otherwise should be continued.
Device B: The investor can incur the cost γ to monitor the entrepreneur's report of the success rate θ.
Device C: The investor can pay the entrepreneur extra compensation (i.e., in addition to u 0 ) to relax the incentive constraints.
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An investor can rely on one or some combinations of the three devices to implement incentive compatibility. For example, the investor can set θ m = θ n (which rules out monitoring), where θ n satisfies T (θ n ) = u 0 (the use of device C is also ruled out). Alternatively, the investor can monitor in every state of θ, set θR(θ) − t = 0, and pay the entrepreneur a lump-sum equal to u 0 . The investor can also offer the entrepreneur the first-best contract that delivers an expected utility equal to T (θ fb ). Clearly, these devices are all costly. The investor must use them efficiently for different parameters of the model. Figure 2 shows two features of the optimal contract as a function of u 0 . First, monitoring is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in u 0 . Second, for all γ > 0, either the optimal contract involves no monitoring for all u 0 (case 2) or it involves no monitoring for u 0 sufficiently close toû 0 (ū 0 < u 0 <û 0 ), the minimum expected utility to the entrepreneur offered by the first-best contract.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose we start with u 0 =û 0 , at which no monitoring occurs, and then lower u 0 a little. In the absence of monitoring, the entrepreneur's expected utility u 0 is paid by T (θ n ), the incentive cost of non-monitoring. A lower u 0 implies a higher θ n . That is, projects with higher success rate θ has to be terminated, otherwise the entrepreneur would be overpaid (relative to the required u 0 ) by the incentive cost of non-monitoring. So the dominating device is A, termination. As u 0 lowers further, the cost of termination gets higher (too much liquidation), and will eventually reach a point where it is higher than the cost of monitoring. At that point, monitoring (device B) becomes the dominating incentive device. Note that, monitoring allows the investor to lower the continuation threshold for θ without increasing the expected payment to the entrepreneur since in the monitoring region, the entrepreneur earns zero profit (the payment is indexed by θ). For a monitoring contract, the division of monitoring and non-monitoring region is determined by the tradeoff between monitoring cost and incentive cost of non-monitoring. For very low u 0 , a high θ n implies that the monitoring cost on a large region ([θ m , θ n ]) might be too high comparing to the incentive cost of non-monitoring T (θ n ), in which a case, paying the incentive cost of non-monitoring becomes the dominating incentive device (device C). In such a case, both devices A and C are used in the optimal contract.
Next, we discuss the role of other parameters H, γ and .
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumptions (1) and (2) hold, and that V (u 0 ) ≥ 0. Holding the model's other parameters constant, (i) (a) There existsĤ ≥ t + such that the optimal contract is the first-best if and only if H ≤Ĥ; (b) There existsH >Ĥ such that for all H ∈ (Ĥ,H), σ sb n is optimal, and for all H >H, σ sb m is optimal.
(ii) Whether the first-best is attainable does not depend on γ. Suppose the first-best is not attainable. Then there existsγ ∈ [0, H − t − ) such that σ sb m is optimal if γ ≤γ; and σ sb n is optimal if γ ≥γ.
(iii) There existˆ and¯ , where 0 <ˆ <¯ , such that the optimal contract is σ sb m if ≤ˆ ; the optimal contract is σ sb n ifˆ ≤ ≤¯ ; the optimal contract is σ fb n if ≥¯ , The proof of Proposition 5 is in the appendix. Consider first how the optimal contract responds to a change in H. Suppose we start with a very low H. A sufficiently low H implies the first-best continuation/termination cut-off θ fb is sufficiently high and hence T (θ fb ) sufficiently low to satisfy T (θ fb ) ≤ u 0 , and hence the first-best attained. This sufficiently low H is defined byĤ. Now raise H fromĤ. Since the first-best is no longer attainable, costly incentive devices must be used to achieve incentive compatibility. As H increases, termination (device A) becomes more costly, and monitoring (device B) becomes relatively more efficient, given that the cost of monitoring remains constant. As H becomes sufficiently high (higher thanH), monitoring becomes optimal. For H belowH but higher thanĤ, termination remains as the dominating incentive device for the investor and the optimal contract is σ sb n . Holding the model's other parameters constant, the efficiency of monitoring is directly determined by the cost γ. Proposition 5 states that monitoring is optimal if and only if monitoring is sufficiently inexpensive (γ <γ). The trade off here is between monitoring cost (device B) and the incentive cost of non-monitoring (device C).
Finally, consider the effects of a change in on the optimal contract. When is higher, the opportunity cost of continuing a project is higher, hence termination should occur with a higher probability; θ fb is higher, and T (θ fb ) is lower. For sufficiently high (higher than¯ ), T (θ fb ) will be lower than u 0 and the first-best is attainable. As falls, for given realizations of θ, termination (device A) becomes more costly, and the cut-off in θ for termination should be lower. Eventually, as falls further, more incentives for truth telling are required, and monitoring (device B) becomes the dominating incentive device.
Credit Market Equilibrium
Up to now, we have assumed that the parameters of the model, H, t, , γ, and the density function g(θ), satisfy Assumptions (1) and (2). Here we make a third assumption: at least for some values of u 0 , it is worthwhile for investors to invest in a project rather than in the storage technology. That is, Assumption (3) There exists u 0 > 0 such that V (u 0 ) ≥ 0. Since the investors' value function V (u 0 ) is weakly decreasing in u 0 , there existsǔ 0 > 0 satisfying V (ǔ 0 ) = 0, such that for all u 0 ≤ǔ 0 , V (u 0 ) ≥ 0, and for all u 0 >ǔ 0 , V (u 0 ) < 0.
To define an equilibrium in the model, we adopt the following competition mechanism for the credit market: the short side of the market extracts all of the surplus from trade.
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There are two cases. First, the economy's total supply of loanable funds exceeds its total demand for funds; that is, δ < λ. In this case, competition among lenders will work to drive the expected payoff for the entrepreneur u 0 up toǔ 0 at which the investors' expected payoffs are zero. Depending on the parameters of the model and the level ofǔ 0 , the optimal contract can be σ
In the second case, the economy's total supply of funds is less than the total demand for funds; that is, δ > λ. In this case, not all projects are funded. Competition for funds will drive the entrepreneur's reservation utility u 0 to zero. In equilibrium, the expected utility of the entrepreneurs whose project is funded is equal to u 
Credit Rationing
Whenever δ > λ, in equilibrium there is always credit rationing of the type discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and Williamson [1987a] , where among a group of identical borrowers some receive loans and some do not, and those who do receive strictly positive expected utility (u 1 0 or u 2 0 ), and hence are strictly better off than those who do not. Why is credit rationed in this model? Sometimes it is because of costly monitoring, as in Williamson [1986 Williamson [ , 1987a .
9 Specifically, when σ sb m is optimal, non-monitoring but continuation region can not be completely eliminated because there is always a region where paying the incentive cost of non-monitoring dominates paying the monitoring cost. Sometimes credit is rationed because of costly termination. In particular, when σ sb n is optimal, some projects with high enough θ are continued, which means the incentive cost of nonmonitoring is positive. In both cases, the entrepreneur's payoff can not be reduced entirely to zero. The notion that credit rationing is a mechanism to avoid excessive termination has not been discussed in the literature. Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] model credit rationing as a mechanism to reduce costly ex post default on loans.
8 Note that the simple competition mechanism we use may be interpreted as a special case of a bargaining process which in principle can take a more general form. Adopting the more general form of the competition mechanism does not affect our results qualitatively. 9 Williamson considers a standard costly state verification model.
Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Here, we study the effects of a change in three of the model's exogenous variables, H, δ, and λ, on the equilibrium financing mechanism and the economy's aggregate output. Throughout this section, we assume Assumptions (1)- (3) are satisfied.
A Decrease in H
As H falls, the cutoff level of θ below which termination occurs is higher, and more projects are terminated. There is a flight for quality in the sense that fully implemented projects have higher probabilities to succeed. Moreover, as H falls, the economy's total output falls more than proportionally. This is because, as H decreases, not only does each firm produce less, but there are fewer firms producing. In other words, the effects of the negative shock to H are amplified by the optimal contract. Proposition 6. Holding the model's other parameters fixed,
(ii)
∂Λ ∂H > 0. There exists H * ≥ t + + γ, independent of u 0 , such that Λ ≤ 0 if and only
The proof of Proposition 6 is straightforward and is omitted here. As H decreases, the investor's value function will shift downward and to the left. Suppose the economy's initial equilibrium has monitored loans. Then, if H falls sufficiently, the economy will experience a transition from monitored loans to non-monitored loans. Non-monitored loans are always more efficient than monitored loans for H sufficiently low.
To summarize, in the model, a sufficiently large decrease in the level of H causes not only aggregate output and total outstanding loans to fall, but also the equilibrium lending mechanism to shift away from monitored lending to non-monitored lending, provided that monitored lending is initially the equilibrium financing mechanism. Finally, note that in order for the initial equilibrium financing mechanism to be monitored loans, everything else constant, H must be sufficiently high. That is, the economy must be initially in a state where projects offer sufficiently high returns in order to experience the kind of transition we have just described. Moreover, as H falls, the transition from monitored loans to nonmonitored loans is monotonic. 
Changes in δ and λ
Suppose the economy initially has an oversupply of credit; i.e., δ < λ, all projects are funded, the entrepreneurs extract all surplus from trade, and their expected payoff iš u 0 . The equilibrium lending mechanism is either monitored loans or non-monitored loans, depending on the value ofǔ 0 . Now increase the number of investment opportunities from δ o < λ to δ n > λ, holding the supply of funds constant. This reversal of bargaining power in the credit market implies that now the entrepreneurs' equilibrium expected utility is reduced fromǔ 0 to u 1 0 in the case of Λ > 0 and to u 2 0 in the case of Λ ≤ 0. Remember that the sign of Λ does not depend on u 0 and, hence, δ and λ. A switch of the equilibrium lending mechanism can only occur in the case of Λ > 0, where the initial optimal contract prescribes σ sb n or σ fb n , and the new equilibrium contract is σ sb m . In such a case, lending activities will shift from non-monitored loans to monitored loans. In the meantime, the induced drop in the entrepreneurs' reservation utility is likely to trigger more termination, unlessǔ 0 is in the flat portion of the value function V . However, the increase of investment opportunities implies that the number of projects that are funded will increase from δ o to λ. Here, the combined effect on total output is ambiguous, depending on whether the downward push of the increased termination can be overturned by the upward lift from the increased initial investment. It is possible that the effect of more termination dominates, and hence the economy's total output falls, as the economy's supply of investment projects increases.
Next, consider the implications of a contraction in the supply of the economy's loanable funds. Suppose again that initially δ < λ. Suppose that there is a decrease in λ to bring λ to a level that is below δ. This shifts the market power away from the entrepreneurs and toward the investors, leading to a decrease in the entrepreneurs' equilibrium expected utility fromǔ 0 to u 1 0 or u 2 0 , which, in turn, leads to more termination and a potential shift of the equilibrium lending mechanism from non-monitored lending to monitored lending. As the supply of loanable funds falls, total investment will fall, more termination will occur, and hence the economy's total output will also fall.
In our model, a fall in the supply of credit can create two effects: a direct credit effect of decline available funds and an interest rate effect. The interest rate effect occurs right when λ falls below δ, where there is a discrete downward jump in the economy's total investment and total output. This effect is caused by a sudden increase in the investor's expected return on a loan (rate of interest). As the expected returns on loans increase, the expected utilities of the entrepreneurs fall, the incentive problems become more severe, more projects are terminated, and aggregate output is lower. After λ has crossed δ and continues to fall, the economy's total investment and total output fall continuously due to credit effect, while the rate of interest remains flat. The same credit effect is discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] , but a somewhat interesting point this paper offers is that a decrease in the total supply of loans may cause aggregate output to fall more than proportionally. A fall in loan supply causes fewer projects to be funded initially, and among those that receive initial funding, more will face termination subsequently.
Concluding Remarks
We have constructed a model of the credit market with costly state verification and moral hazard. Lenders in the model use three incentive devices, monitoring, termination and overpayment (credit rationing), to obtain optimal loan contracting. The economy's aggregate activity and equilibrium mechanism of investment financing are jointly determined. We have analyzed how changes in the model's exogenous variables, including the returns of the economy's investment projects and the supply of loans, affect the economy's aggregate output and the types of the credit through which investment is funded.
The relationship between the choice of the firm's financing mechanism and the economy's aggregate investment and output has been at the center of the recent discussions on the nature and role of the so-called "credit crunch" which occurred during the 1990-91 U.S. recession. During this recession, the economy's total outstanding loans fell dramatically, and more importantly, the fraction of bank loans fell sharply relative to unintermediated loans, including public bonds and commercial paper (see Friedman and Kuttner [1993] , Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox [1993] , Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1996] ). Although our static analysis is not directly applicable for discussing issues related to business cycle fluctuations, we speculate that the ideas of the paper, when imbedded in a growth type dynamic framework, could be useful for that purpose. Specifically, one could envision embedding the model in a dynamic environment to produce joint oscillations in economic activity and in the type of credit used, and use the predictions to test different theories for what causes a specific recession.
In the literature of financial intermediation, bank loans and other types of intermediated loans are often characterized as a lending mechanism that involves monitoring as an essential feature (e.g., Diamond [1984 Diamond [ , 1991 , Williamson [1986] , Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] ). Suppose we associate the contracts with monitoring in the model with intermediated loans in practice and the contracts without monitoring with unintermediated lending. Then one could imagine using the ideas of the paper to provide a real explanation for what happened during the 1990-91 U.S. recession: A decrease in the returns of the economy's investment projects (i.e., H in the model) caused a downturn in GDP because of increased liquidation, accompanied by a shift of the economy's lending mechanism from bank loans to unintermediated credit.
Notice that, in our model, both a decrease in the projects' return, H, and a decrease in the supply of the economy's credit, λ, can cause a decrease in the economy's aggregate output. The difference is, with the decrease in H, the equilibrium loan contract tends to shift to more termination and less monitoring; with the decrease in λ, the equilibrium loan contract tends to shift to both more termination and more monitoring. In both cases, credit rationing occurs as entrepreneurs' incentive problem becomes more severe. These predictions of the model suggests that declining project return H as a cause is consistent with the credit crunch explanation for the fall in bank loans relative to other types of credit during the 1990-91 U.S. recession, while a decrease of available funds is not.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. We show that there exists a contractσ = {M ; Φ;x; y(θ), θ ∈ B, Y D ; R(θ), R 0 (θ), θ ∈ A;R(θ),R 0 (θ), θ ∈ C} such thatσ is equivalent to σ, and thatR(θ) andR 0 (θ) are constants on C. Note thatσ is identical to σ except forR(θ),R 0 (θ), andx. Without loss of generality, assume that C has a minimum point: θ 1 ≡ min θ∈C θ. LetR(θ) = R(θ 1 ), R 0 (θ) = R 0 (θ 1 ) for all θ ∈ C, and allowx to be determined later.
(i) We first showσ is incentive compatible. We need to show only that the revision on C satisfies conditions (6)-(8), and (10). Conditions (6) and (8) are obviously satisfied on C, given that θ 1 ∈ C, andR(θ) = R(θ 1 ),R 0 (θ) = R 0 (θ 1 ), for all θ ∈ C. Since condition (7) holds for θ = θ 1 , for any
Thus σ also satisfies (7) for all θ ∈ C. Similarly, condition (10) holds for θ = θ 1 , which implies θ 1 R(θ 1 ) ≥ t. Then, for any θ ∈ C, we have θR(θ) ≥ θ 1 R(θ 1 ) ≥ t. That is, (10) is satisfied with any θ ∈ C.
(ii) Withσ instead of σ, the entrepreneur's expected utility is different only in C. Let
We need to showx ≥ 0. But by (6), ∀ θ ∈ C, θR(θ) + R 0 (θ) ≥ θR(θ 1 ) + R 0 (θ 1 ) = θR(θ) +R 0 (θ). That is, withσ, for all θ ∈ C, entrepreneur E's expected payoff is less than or equal to that of the original contract. We therefore have:x ≥ x ≥ 0. By (ii), the investor's payoff is the same withσ as with σ. So we have shown thatσ is equivalent to the original contract σ.
Step 2. We further demonstrate that the contractσ is equivalent to a third contract σ = {M ; Φ;x; y(θ), θ ∈ B,Ŷ D ;R(θ),R 0 (θ), θ ∈ A ∪ C}, which is otherwise identical toσ except
(i) We show that both the investor and the entrepreneur are indifferent betweenσ and σ. The entrepreneur's expected payoff on A underσ is the same pointwise as under σ since for each θ ∈ A,
By (45), underσ, if the project with θ in C succeeds, the entrepreneur receives the expected payoff R C that he would receive underσ. His total expected payment on C when the project fails, µ(C)R 0 (θ 1 ), and part of the payment on D, µ(D)(Y D − R 0 (θ 1 )) (which is positive by (8)), are moved from C and D, respectively, into the constant paymentx (an increase from x). Thus the two contracts give the same expected payoffs to both agents.
(ii) We show that the new contractσ is incentive compatible. First, since the changes on A do not affect the entrepreneur's expected payoff pointwise, the left-hand side of the relevant constraints (6) and (7) are the same as those underσ. Second, note that for any θ ∈ Θ, and any θ ∈ C,R 0 (θ ) = R C ≥ 0 =R 0 (θ ), and
That is, the right-hand sides of conditions (6)- (9) underσ are all smaller than that underσ. Therefore, for any θ ∈ A ∪ B, conditions (6)-(9) are satisfied underσ. Next, given that the definition ofŶ D by (49), and that conditions (6)-(8) are satisfied for any θ ∈ C ∪ D underσ, they are also satisfied under contractσ. Last, since constraint (10) is satisfied underσ, for any θ ∈ A, θR(θ) ≥ t, and θ 1 R C ≥ t. By (47),R(θ) ≥ R(θ), so for any θ ∈ A, θR(θ) ≥ θR(θ) ≥ t. For any θ ∈ C, θ ≥ θ 1 , so θR(θ) = θR C ≥ θ 1 R C ≥ t. Therefore, condition (10) holds underσ.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let X and Y be sets of real numbers. We say X > * Y if and only if for all x ∈ X, ∀ y ∈ Y, x > y. Next, let P = µ × µ be the product measure on Θ × Θ. We say X >Y if X > * Y almost surely, that is, X >Y if P (x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and y > x = 0. Given the above, the proposition states that for any given optimal contract σ, there is contract which is equivalent to σ and which satisfiesΦ > * Φ .
We first show that σ satisfies Φ >Φ , which is equivalent to showing A >B, A >D, C >B, and C >D. 
otherwise,x = x.
We need only verify that the incentive constraints (17)- (20) and (23) (18) and (23),
That is,R(θ B ) satisfies (18) and (23). Since σ satisfies constraints (19) and (20), we have for all θ ∈ Θ B , y(θ) (19) and (20). Thus we have shown thatσ is incentive compatible.
11 Given θ is continuously distributed, the sets Θ A and Θ B can be cut arbitrarily small to satisfy this property.
Next, we show thatσ Pareto dominates σ. By construction,
. Then moving from σ toσ the entrepreneur's expected payoff is changed by
and the investor's expected payoff is changed by
Thus both parties are better off underσ than under σ.
Then underσ the entrepreneur's expected payoff decreases on Θ B compared to what she receives under σ on Θ A , but the decrease is made up exactly by the increase of x tox, so her total expected payoff remains the same. Now the investor's expected payment to the entrepreneur is the same, but the investor's expected payoff is increased by
This is because projects with higher success rates are continued. Again,σ Pareto dominates σ.
( and R(θ) has a minimum on Θ A . Now consider an alternative contractσ which is identical to σ except
for all θ A and θ D , and hence constraint (22) is satisfied by contractσ. As in the proof for A >B, we can show thatR(θ D ) satisfies constraints (17), (18), and (23), and thusσ is incentive compatible. As in the proof for A >B, we can show thatσ Pareto dominates σ, a contradiction.
(iii) We show C >B. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume that there exists Θ B ⊆ B and Θ C ⊆ C such that Θ B > * Θ C , and µ(Θ B ) = µ(Θ C ) = 0. Now consider an alternative contractσ which is identical to σ except
Since every θ B ∈ Θ B satisfies (19) and (20),
That is,ỹ(θ C ) satisfies (19) and (20). Also, take an arbitrary (21) and (24) are satisfied on Θ B . So the modified contract satisfies all the relevant incentive constraints.
. But since Θ B > * Θ C , the entrepreneur's expect payoff is increased by
and the investor's expected payoff is increased by
That is, both agents' expected payoffs are strictly higher underσ than under σ.
(iv) Last, we show C >D. Constraints (21) and (22) directly imply that C > * D, which further implies C >D. To summarize, we have shown that Φ >Φ . Given that contract σ satisfies Φ >Φ , it is trivial to show that there is an equivalent contractσ that satisfiesΦ > * Φ . Since Φ > * Φ can only be violated on a measure zero set, we can rearrange monitoring and continuation/termination policies on this measure-zero set to eliminate the violations without affecting the payoffs.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We first prove the following lemma: Lemma. If σ is an optimal contract, then Φ = ∅.
P roof. Consider an optimal contract σ. By Proposition 2, we assume Φ = [θ 1 , 1] and Φ = [0, θ 1 ). Suppose Φ = ∅. Then consider a contractσ which is otherwise identical to σ except
Notice that since t > 0, µ(D) = 0.
By construction, for all θ ∈D, θR C − t ≤ t HR C − t ≤ 0 =Ŷ D , and hence constraint (22) is satisfied onD. The contractσ satisfies constraint (17) since R C ≥R C .σ also satisfies (18) since (23) holds under σ. IfR C = R C , then clearly constraints (21) and (24) are both satisfied. If H =R C < R C , then for all θ ∈Ĉ, θ ≥ t/H, θR C = θH ≥ t, hence constraints (21) and (24) are also satisfied. Therefore,σ is incentive compatible. Finally, the expected payment to the entrepreneur under contractσ is the same as under contract σ, but the investor's expected payoff is increased by µ(D) − D (θH − t)dG(θ) > 0. This contradicts the fact that the σ is optimal. The lemma is proven.
We now prove the proposition. We first show that given the optimal continuation/termination policy Φ, the optimal monitoring region A is a lower interval of Φ and the non-monitoring region C is the complement upper interval of Φ. Suppose this is not true. That is, suppose there is an optimal contract σ such that a subset Θ A of A is embedded in C, that is, for all θ A ∈ Θ A , θ A > inf C θ. Without loss of generality assume µ(Θ A ) = 0.
Consider contractσ which is otherwise identical to σ except
To show thatσ is incentive compatible, we need only check that constraints (21) and (24) are satisfied for all θ A ∈ Θ A . Since for all θ ∈ C, θR C −t ≥ Y D , we have (inf C θ)R C −t ≥ Y D , which in turn implies for all θ A ∈ Θ A , θ A R C − t ≥ Y D given that θ A > inf C θ. That is, (21) is satisfied. Constraint (24) is implied by (21) since Y D ≥ 0.
By construction ofx, the entrepreneur's expected payoff remains the same underσ. But the investor gains by the savings of the monitoring cost γ µ(Θ A ) > 0. This contradicts the fact that the contract σ is optimal.
Next, we show that B = ∅. Let σ be an optimal contract which has B = ∅. By Proposition 2, Φ > * Φ , and from the above proof, C > Using the equations R C ≥ t/θ n =R C andŶ D = 0, it is easy to check that the contractσ satisfies all the incentive constraints including (17), (18), (21), (22), (24), as well as the nonnegative constraints (13). Moreover, the construction ofx implies that the entrepreneur's expected compensation underσ is the same as under σ. However, underσ the investor's expected payoff is increased by the savings of the monitoring cost γµ(A ∪ B) > 0. This contradicts the assumption that σ is optimal.
Finally, we show (iii) holds. Suppose σ is optimal and it has a compensation scheme that differs from what is given by the proposition. We need only show that σ is equivalent to a contractσ whose compensation scheme takes the form that is given by the proposition. Let the compensation scheme ofσ be given byR(θ) = t/θ for all θ ∈ A,R C = t/θ n ,Ŷ D = 0, andx = x+ A θ(R(θ)−t/θ)dG(θ)+ C θ(R C −R C )dG(θ)+µ(D)Y D . It is easy to check that σ satisfies incentive constraints (17)-(24). Since the compensation schedule of the contract σ also satisfies these constraints, in particular, for all θ ∈ A, R(θ) ≥ t/θ =R(θ), for all θ ∈ C, R C ≥ t/θ n =R C , and Y D ≥ 0 =Ŷ D , we havex ≥ x. Clearly, the compensation scheme ofσ conforms with the proposition, andσ is equivalent to σ.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We first show that by assumptions (1) and (2), the objective function O(θ m , θ n ) is strictly concave in both θ m and θ n .
The function O(θ m , θ n ) is strictly concave if its Hessian matrix is negative definite. By the definition of function O(θ m , θ n ) in equation (33), ∂O(θ m , θ n ) 2 /∂θ n ∂θ m = 0. So, we only need to show that the second derivatives with respect to θ m and θ n are strictly negative. If θ m H − (t + + γ) < 0, then ∂O(θ m , θ n ) 2 /∂θ 2 m < 0 is equivalent to g (θ m ) g(θ m ) < H (t + + γ) − θ m H which is implied by the second inequality of assumption (2). With respect to θ n ,
By assumptions (1) and (2),
hence, J(θ n ) < 0, or equivalently, ∂O(θ m , θ n ) 2 /∂θ 2 n < 0. So, O(θ m , θ n ) is strictly concave in both θ m and θ n .
Given that the objective function O(θ m , θ n ) is strictly concave, and that the constraint set defined by (34) is convex, problem (P 4) has a unique solution. We can solve (P 4) with Lagrange's method. Let ρ 1 be the multiplier for constraint θ m ≤ θ n , and ρ 2 be the multiplier for constraint θ n ≤θ n . Then the Lagrange is given by L(θ m , θ n , ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) = (c) It is obvious thatθ m is an increasing function in γ. Also,θ n as a solution to equation (36) is a decreasing function of γ, since totally differentiate (36) with respect to θ n and γ atθ n , we have
given that function O is strictly concave. Sinceθ n does not depend on γ, min{θ n ,θ n } is also a decreasing function of γ. Bothθ m and min{θ n ,θ n } are continuous functions of γ. By (c),θ m is increasing in γ and min{θ n ,θ n } is decreasing in γ. By (b), as γ → 0,θ m < min{θ n ,θ n }, but at γ = H − t − , θ m > min{θ n ,θ n }. Therefore, there exists aγ ∈ (0, H − t − ) such thatθ m = min{θ n ,θ n }, for all γ <γ,θ m < min{θ n ,θ n }, and for γ ∈ [γ, H − t − ],θ m ≥ min{θ n ,θ n }. Hence by Proposition 4, the optimal contract is the one with monitoring σ sb m for γ <γ, and it is the one without monitoring σ sb n for γ ∈ [γ, H − t − ]. (iii) Bothθ n andθ n do not depend on . Let¯ ≥ 0 be such that θ m (¯ ) = t +¯ + γ H = min{θ n ,θ n }.
If no such¯ exists, set¯ = 0. Then by Proposition 4, for all <¯ ,θ m ( ) < min{θ n ,θ n }, hence the optimal contract is σ sb m . For all ∈ [¯ ,ˆ ),θ m ( ) ≥ min{θ n ,θ n }, hence the optimal contract is σ sb n .
